

U.S. Army Military Police Professionalization—Relevancy Beyond 2012

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**U.S. ARMY MILITARY POLICE PROFESSIONALIZATION—RELEVANCY BEYOND
2012**

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ABSTRACT

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As the U.S. Army's proponent for policing, in support of the U.S. government, Department of Defense and Army operational and strategic goals, Military Police must seek to become a more technically professional organization in order to support unified land operations and the future. This requires the Military Police Corps to fully examine the current leader professional development tracks and individual training with the primary goal of improving on policing expertise to support the force. This examination requires innovative plans to expand on the policing technical aspects so the Military Police Corps is postured to execute stability operations anywhere and at anytime.

U.S. ARMY MILITARY POLICE PROFESSIONALIZATION RELEVANCY BEYOND 2012

As the U.S. Army's proponent for policing, in support of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense (DoD) and Army operational and strategic goals, the Military Police (MP) Corps must seek to become a more technically professional organization in order to support current contingency operations and the future. This requires the Military Police Corps (MPC) to fully examine the current leader professional development and individual training with the primary goal of improving on policing expertise to support the force. This examination requires innovative plans to expand on the technical aspects of policing so the Military Police Corps is postured to execute unified land operations anywhere and at anytime.

Framing the Problem

Before examining how we can improve the level of policing expertise, which has a direct impact on professionalization within the MPC, we must frame the problem in three areas: the purpose of the police in society, the purpose of the Army in the future, and finally, the purpose of the MPC to support unified land operations now and in the future.

The Purpose of the Police in Society. The primary purpose of an established and credible policing force in societies involves enforcing the rule of law, providing basic security and assisting in regional stability. The etymology of the word "police" can be traced back to the early 1530s and was formed from a middle French word *Politia*. Its basic meaning is "to protect the city." The concept of police further evolved throughout

the centuries within different parts of the world. In the United States, policing concepts were adopted from the British. The U.S. Marshal system began in 1789 which spurred the creation of other policing entities. No matter what type of government structure the country has, the basic concept of policing includes a society conforming to local laws enforced by a governing police force structure. Police theorists such as Robert M. Perito and David M. Bayley have produced volumes of information relating to policing and its' importance for societies to maintain a level of stable self government.

To the act of serving and protecting the local population in a manner consistent with democratic values we give the name *core policing*. Not only is it necessary for the development of stable self government it ensures the police are more effective in containing violence that arises variously from insurgency, terrorism, and violent crime. Core policing is an enhancer both of legitimacy and law-enforcement effectiveness.¹

Societies that have functioning policing capabilities are more likely to have less violence and therefore will foster climates of stability within their region. David Bayley outlines in his book titled "Changing of the Guard," four principles that directly impact on creating or reforming police entities which in themselves are a prescription for building regional stability. First, police must be accountable to law rather than to the government.

Democratic police do not make the law, they apply it, and any judgments must be subject to monitoring and correction by the courts.² Secondly, police are required to protect human rights based on the governing laws of the land. Such laws include freedom of speech, unwarranted arrest, imprisonment, or even banishment. The third principle Bayley describes is the basic concept of policing: that police must be accountable to the people they protect and serve. Accountability is the watchword for the third principle if any police organization inspires to be professional. Finally, the fourth principle entails how the police place the needs of the populace and private

groups above their needs. Police, like other uniformed entities, are the visible form of their government's authority. Police are unique because of their coveted responsibility to enforce the law. According to a report from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),

Effective policing helps create an environment where sustainable development can flourish. Good policing, which serves the people rather than just the state, is central to preventing conflicts, preserving social stability during crises and supporting post-conflict rehabilitation. This basic security and stability is needed for countries to progress socially and economically.³

Societies also include military installations comprised of military members, family members and civilians. They, too, require functioning policing capabilities; therefore, the MPC has a vested interest in grounded policing theories that validate why policing expertise remains relevant. Policing expertise within the MPC, in addition to the other capabilities such as maneuver and mobility support, corrections and police intelligence operations, reinforces the uniqueness the MPC provides to the Army.

The Purpose of the Army in the Future. The Army, like other branches of services has endured over ten years of war, with the majority of the war dedicated to the stability operations umbrella including reconstruction, host nation security force development, and the like. The U.S. Army's 38th Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno stated in October 2011,

As our former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike G. Mullen, so aptly stated, 'Our Army is the center of gravity for the U.S. military.' With these requirements in mind, my intent is for an all volunteer Army to remain the most decisive land force in the world, provide depth and versatility to the Joint Force, be more effective in its employment and provide greater flexibility for national security decision makers in defense of the nation at home and abroad.⁴

The past 10 years of war have provided the MPC a level of depth and versatility within the Army while providing it some experience in host nation security force development. Arguably the past 10 years have also shown some policing expertise gaps within the Military Police Corps.

The MPC has also recognized with past deployments ranging from the Balkans to present deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, that the key to stabilization within a country is to first establish three primary pillars of support—Rule of Law, Corrections and Security. These three pillars have a positive impact on establishing the framework for a new government that ultimately improves on the overall level of security.⁵ Building this framework requires U.S. forces to work with coalition partners to improve the host nation's security capacity which directly impacts the country's ability to normalize. Because of the lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army cannot rely on being trained and ready for only one type of Operating Environment (OE). General Martin Dempsey cautioned against the U.S. military training for that one contingency of the past versus a force that can handle global issues based on demographic and economic shifts.⁶ A good example has been the prioritized focus in the Middle East with the full knowledge of issues that exist in the Pacific region. In addition to Dempsey's comment, Professor Bill Flavin's monograph "Finding the Balance: U.S. Military and Future Operations" also reinforces how the U.S. military has been quick to develop prescriptive doctrine based on the current OE. Flavin commented on eight change-makers ranging from Secretary Gates to Generals Dempsey, Patraeus, Mattis, Chiarellis, Caldwell and McMaster that have influenced shifting doctrine to a focus on

future concepts.⁷ This focus still takes into account guiding principles for stability and reconstruction in which the MPC will undoubtedly have a role in the foreseen future.

The Purpose of the Military Police Corps (MPC). As the Army's proponent for policing, the MPC has a critical role in remaining as a relevant enabling force. More importantly, the MPC in the next decade could be DoD's premier source for assisting host nations in building their security capacity. Going back in history, since WW II, the military has had the unique authority under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention to establish Rule of Law (RoL) and train Host Nation (HN) police. However, the Department of State (DoS) is responsible for building partner capacity missions and predominately has requested DoD to train military police of the HN. The MPC cannot rest solely on the lessons learned from operations in southwest Asia since some of the lessons learned may not be applicable in other regions of the world. Additionally, the MPC requires that leaders understand principles of policing for garrison MP missions.

In the past ten years, the MPC primary missions have been Policing and Detention Operations in a full spectrum environment in order to provide protection, support mobility, and promote the rule of law. The MPC history has spanned 70 years and experienced several periods of transformation. It was not until 1941, during World War II, the MPC was a formally recognized branch of service with the primary goal of providing area security, limited maneuver and mobility support and law enforcement. The motto for the MPC is "Of the Troops, For the Troops," emphasizing a creed to remain a force of choice across the continuum of direct engagement in combat operations, as seen during the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968, to current operations in Afghanistan. Other examples include Operation JUST CAUSE, humanitarian relief operations, and

peace keeping in Bosnia and Kosovo. The examples above once again reinforce why the MPC remains the Army's lead proponent for policing which includes the following critical areas: Law Enforcement, Criminal Investigations, and Detention Operations. The MPC, like other branches in the Army in these times of fiscal constraint, has had its capabilities scrutinized. Since the late 1990s, the military has been thrust into an OE referred to as VUCA–Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous. The 2nd edition of the Strategic Leadership Primer in 2004 further defined VUCA below:

Volatility refers to the rate of change of information and the rate of change of the situation. A rapidly changing environment calls for adaptive and innovative decision making. Both the nature and the means of competition are changing rapidly, driven on the “hard” side by technology and on the “soft” side by increasingly easy communication.

Uncertainty stems from the inability to know everything about the current situation and the difficulty of predicting what the effects of a proposed change today will be on the future. With uncertainty, strategic leaders must be willing to take measured and prudent risks, be able to assess risk accurately and develop risk management strategies.

Complexity differs from *uncertainty*, though its effects may sometimes be similar. At the strategic level, there are an enormous number of factors that have causal bearing on a given situation. The web of cause and effect linkages-- second, third, and multiple-order effects have become more complex in our globalized, technologically connected world.

Ambiguity exists when a decision maker does not understand the significance of a given event or situation—doesn't know what is happening. It can occur when leaders have insufficient mental models and observed events “don't make sense”. Vulnerability to misinterpretation of events in complex situations is high when decisions are centralized, decision pressure is high, the decision maker is powerful and the decision maker acts alone.⁸

The MPC, because it possesses versatile skills sets, has the ability to excel and remain at the forefront in support of future unified land operations conducted within a VUCA environment.

There are at least three key elements of strengths and weaknesses within the MPC that further support framing the problem, which are: expertise, primacy and legitimacy. All three are relevant contributors to the overall professionalization of the MPC, allowing it to maintain its' relevancy beyond 2012. Because of the sheer amount of information for all three areas, expertise will be the area of focus for this paper.

Expertise

The current operations in Afghanistan and most recently in Iraq have solidified a definite need for a force that can assist in building the interim security. Many MP leaders have recognized this expertise requirement to be prevalent within the MPC. In addition to the observations of MP leaders, numerous Rand studies and the latest Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency manual validate the expertise requirement as building interim security capacity. Similarly, Army officers within the Military Police Corps have also identified problems within the MPC that must be addressed.

What is the problem (if not the primary problem from which all other identified problems stem) is the lack of expert knowledge, skills and the abilities of the Military Police leaders to manage the performance of police- specific operations at the organizational level in order to achieve substantive public safety outcomes such as reducing crime, disorder, and public fear-levels of crime.⁹

Military Police leaders' lack of expert knowledge in the technical concepts of policing is directly linked to their reputation and affects whether they are seen as police professionals.

It seems apparent by this doctrinal excerpt and the contracting of retired police officials through the Army Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) program, that the Army does not see the Military Police as legitimate police professionals. With regard to legitimacy of expert knowledge in the eyes of the client, the Military Police have a weak case for this element of professionalism.¹⁰

Many of these Military Police colleagues have identified gaps within the technical aspects of Policing in their strategic research papers (SRP) for Senior Service College.

Titles include:

- Putting The Police Back Into The Military Police
- The Marshall Force: A 21st Century Constabulary for Future Demands
- The Transformation and Restructuring of the Military Police Corps
- Foreign Police Development: The Third Time's The Charm

Increasing the level of expertise within the MPC has become increasingly more important in the past ten years of operations. As stated earlier, the two primary mission sets, Detention Operations and Policing—(in the form of Host Nation Police development) have gained significant traction within the past few years. A Rand study conducted in 2009 provides a supporting view as it outlines an expertise gap within the technical policing skill set.¹¹ This study examined the need for a U.S. Stability Police Force because there is a void within the MPC on high-end policing skills such as crowd and riot control, special weapons and tactics (SWAT), and investigations of organized criminal groups. It noted that, the skills and training necessary to performing such functions are only available in the civilian law enforcement world.

Our analysis clearly indicates that the United States needs a Stability Police Force (SPF) or some other way to accomplish the SPF mission. Stability operations have become an inescapable reality of U.S. foreign policy.¹²

This study further discusses the cost, in FY 2007 dollars, to fund an SPF that could deploy within 30 days as \$637.3 million annually. The capabilities that would exist within an SPF unit can be fine tuned within the MPC as part of the technical professionalization efforts that will be outlined further in this paper.

The MPC performed civilian-like policing functions prior to 9/11 when installations had very few Department of the Army Civilian Police Officers. The MPC performed this mission as part of the unit's training cycle with what are called *road MP*. Most military installation Provost Marshal Offices (PMO) or Director of Emergency Services (DES) conducted law enforcement certification training for two or three weeks to ensure the MPs were sufficiently trained to perform law enforcement duties. Several military installation MP units cross trained with neighboring local law enforcement departments, either city or county, and developed solid partnerships. This productive relationship was developed during a period of lower operational tempo in the Army which allowed MP companies more flexibility to cross-pollinate training with outside law enforcement entities. It was not until after deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, that it was quickly realized there was a huge demand for MPs to conduct police development, training, and mentorship with the host nation police forces.

It was also during this time period, due to high deployment cycles, there was a decrease of MPs performing law enforcement duties in garrison environments. This decrease had an impact on the MPC's ability to maintain the experience level in policing among junior leaders at the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) and Officer tiers. This same MP population would be the critical asset we needed to fill out the hundreds of Police Transition Teams (PTTs) for host nation police development. Taking this into account, prior U.S. Army Military Police (USAMPS) Commandants at Fort Leonard Wood identified the need to increase law enforcement training hours to get MP leaders the proper balance between the tactical and technical. The process of adding additional training hours to any course offered at USAMPS requires a lengthy review and analysis

process followed by a series of negotiations with Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to gain their approval.

History has shown that from 1948 to 2006 the need has continued to grow for stability operations which include a subset mission of host nation police development as described in Figure 1.¹³




Figure 1: Number of U.S. and Non-U.S. Stability and Peacekeeping Operations, 1948-2006

Another Rand study published in July 2009, entitled Warrior Police—Developing Army Security and Investigative Capabilities for Modern Conflicts, reinforces why it is relevant for the MP Corps to continue the professionalization of leader development in the arena of technical aspects.

Threat groups that once had nothing to do with one another now recognize that globalization, technology, and networks allow them to cooperate toward achieving common objectives. Increasingly, criminal, political, and military threats are just different aspects of the same problem. Protecting state capacity in general and U.S. preeminence in

particular will require unprecedented coordination between military and security agencies. Increasing the U.S. military's capacity for police type operations will preempt some of these challenges, since the U.S. military will invariably be involved in future conflicts.¹⁴

As mentioned previously, as observed by various researchers, completed by either the Rand Institute or senior MP leaders through strategy research papers submitted for their senior service college requirement, we have room for improvement in the expertise area. An examination of the current leader development pre 9/11 and post 9/11 has seen some increase in the amount of training hours that specifically focus on the policing expertise. This increase in the amount of training hours at U.S. Army Military Police School was the result of feedback and analysis from MP leaders across the field. During my tenure as the Director of Training, USAMPS from Jun 2010 to Jun 2011, our efforts to evaluate training hours dedicated to the policing arena continued across the entire training domain. This domain included: One Station Unit Training (OSUT) for the 31B MP series Military Occupational Series (MOS); Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) 31B MP for the Advanced Leader and Senior Leader Courses (ALC/SLC) and the 31D (Criminal Investigation Division (CID) MOS series); Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) for CID Warrant Officers; Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) for MP Lieutenants; and, finally, the Captains Career Course (CCC) for MP Captains. Figure #2 below provides more clarity on the number of hours for pre 9/11 and post 9/11:

Type of Training	Pre 9/11 LE Hours	Post 9/11 LE Hours
OSUT	155	117 *
31B ALC	28	63.7
31D ALC	78	103.7
31B SLC	35	71.4
31B SLC	52	100.4
WOES	Pure LE	Pure LE
BOLC	59	86.5
CCC	156.7	164.5

Figure 2: USAMPS Law Enforcement Pure Training Hours Pre 9/11 & Post 9/11¹⁵

* **Note:** Denotes a reduction of pure law enforcement training to allow more hours for detainee operations type training.

Some of the adjustments in hours occurred in 2003, 2009 and 2010 after months of debate with Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and resulted in some of the courses above receiving additional training weeks. The Department of Army Civilian Police Academy, located at USAMPS, conducts 309 hours of training and the CID Special Agent Course conducts 400 hours of training. USAMPS conducts periodic course reviews, called the Critical Task Selection Board (CTSB), about every 18 months. Solicitations are sent across the MP field (Active Duty, Reserves and National Guard) requesting representatives to USAMPS for approximately five days to conduct the CTSB. This process is a critical to the MPC to remain relevant in light of evolving doctrine and ever changing OE.

Solution Framework

One process that can be used to form a solution set involves focusing in three areas: Knowledge Base, Skills Sets, and Abilities (KSA). Studying the KSAs to flush out the requirements assists in identifying capability gaps that zero in on policing expertise within the MPC to fill the gaps. The current hours of training focused on technical

policing was outlined above in the table, e.g.: the knowledge base. Further improvements in the knowledge base can be made in a variety of ways such as:

Increase the amount of training hours at USAMPS or The Army School System (TASS) that are deemed policing centric. Adjusting the amount of hours in an already resource constrained environment may be a challenge; thus it requires MP leaders to analyze the amount of training hours that are pure policing centric.

Enact a professionalizing self-development program that tracks MP leaders' KSA advancements. This self development program may evolve into a track that can award certificates of training or confer an academic degree that reinforces policing specialization.

In BG Colleen McGuire's 2001 research paper entitled, *Constabulary Training for a Full Spectrum Force*, she looked at the value of a constabulary training program that could be adapted to stability operations in environments such as Iraq or Afghanistan. She found that many of the same leadership and soldier attributes, missions and roles, and training requirements identified by leaders nearly 60 years ago are similar, if not the same, as those desired today.

Performing peace support operations, today's full-spectrum soldier, a well-trained, value-based, volunteer is expected to investigate alleged violations or question suspects; negotiate and mediate; verify disarmament and demobilization; conduct and verify prisoner of war exchanges; provide relief to refugees; restore emergency infrastructure functions; and provide security.¹⁶

How do we ensure these types of skills remain embedded within our MP force structure? These skills have a direct correlation to improving the level of policing expertise. The current training throughout the domains previously mentioned aligns with the majority of these tasks.

If we want to ensure these tasks remain embedded, the MPC can address the feasibility of implementing a Job Skills Testing for the 31 Series MOS at the noncommissioned officer (NCO) level. Proficiency level testing that determines advancement in rank would be a positive reinforcement to the NCO Corps. The U.S. Air Force requires NCOs to take a Specialty Knowledge Test (SKT) and their score is used in conjunction with other requirements for the NCOs to advance in rank. This would be a good example of reinforcing proficiency sustainment among NCOs in order to ensure they are “certified” in all aspects of policing. A second option that warrants further analysis may be an officer certification program that focuses on those MP Officers who do not have Criminal Justice degrees to obtain the necessary training certificate. The Police Executive Development (POLEX) program offered at Pennsylvania State University is a good example in the development of skills and abilities in leadership, problem solving, motivation, risk management, policy development, policy implementation, and ethically driven leadership. In addition to the Job Skills Testing and a certification program, a robust training cycle time period is required for the MP to be under a *training officer* to gain the practical, applied experience.

Current Training Gaps–Law Enforcement/Policing Centric

Mutual Assistance or Mutual Aid agreements exist in various forms of support between Army installations and neighboring city or county law enforcement organizations. Such agreements can easily assist in fulfilling some of these training gaps. Mutual Assistance agreements can be modified to include shared training between both law enforcement entities. This has been suggested in policing circles. John Awtrey, in a 2004 article published in the *Police Chief* suggested that military

police train with their civilian counterparts as part of a greater effort to building cooperation between civilians and military.

Having examined some of the differences and similarities between military and civilian law enforcement, and understanding that military bases do not exist in a vacuum but rather as a part of civilian communities-it becomes apparent that the two parallel structures can build and enhance their cooperation efforts to better serve their total local community and address common concerns. Whether in a civilian jurisdiction or on a military installation, each day will bring new challenges. In order to start the cooperation process between the local law enforcement agency and military counterpart, it is necessary to reach out and get to know and understand each other. This first step seems simple and obvious, but it is not always done. The IACP can help identify civilian and military law enforcement executives.¹⁷

This could be a strong enabler among the junior leaders (NCOs and Officers) who lack the high level of policing expertise that reside within the local police or sheriff's department.

Final Recommendations / Way Ahead

There are at least three areas the MPC should continue to push forward or initiate in the future: Credentialing; using outside organizations as enablers to improve the MPC's policing expertise and relevancy; and, finally, increase the level of policing expertise among our MP force structure.

Credentialing within the MPC aligns perfectly with the Army's recently stated campaign, *The Profession of Arms*. As described in a recent TRADOC Army Pamphlet,

Army Professionals, in turn, are responsible individually to develop and maintain the necessary moral character and competence, while following their own personal calling to a work that is more than a job—their moral calling of privileged duty to service in the defense of the Republic. They do this by completing the education, training, and experience necessary to ultimately be certified in **character**, **competence**, and **commitment** by the institution.¹⁸

The last sentence reinforces the importance of credentialing as certification implies competence and particularly so, in the U.S. policing community. Credentialing police training and education grows ever more important as society becomes more and more attune to police actions being displayed in the growing social media. When a police department, state or federal organization affiliates itself with recognized credentialing organizations as outlined below, in essence that department is partnering with other member organizations to demonstrate to the public that they are in deed, aligned technically and tactically with common police procedures. The department can demonstrate their ability to design, develop and present law enforcement training and education using educational standards. Such, a law enforcement academy or program provides assurance to the citizens they serve that the academy or program has voluntarily submitted to a process of self-regulation. Additionally, the academy or program has successfully achieved compliance with a set of standards that were collectively established by their peers among their professional community. This demonstrates their adherence to quality, effectiveness, and integrity.

To accomplish this goal, trainers in the law enforcement discipline, working through a professional accrediting body, assist each other in evaluating and improving their professionalism which ultimately validates whether or not the police force has the necessary expertise. A high degree of public confidence in the competence and professionalism of federal, state and local peace officers is an important outcome of this process.

Credentialing also supports the overall policing strategy for the MPC—that of being responsive, instead of reactive, during the development of host nation police.

Expertise is embedded within the credentialing process which has been the foundations of many prestigious organizations as outlined in the next paragraph.

USAMPS has been awarded three credentials in the past few years: FLETA, ACE and ACA. The definitions and their significance to the MPC are provided below:

FLETA: Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation was formed in 2000 in an effort to increase the professionalism of federal law enforcement training. A task force of key training leaders from principal federal and state law enforcement agencies collaboratively conducted research to establish a premier training accreditation model. In the development of the model, federal law enforcement training professionals established standards and procedures to evaluate the training programs and training academies used to train federal law enforcement agents and officers. The intent was to develop an independent accreditation process that provides law enforcement agencies with an opportunity to voluntarily demonstrate that they meet an established set of professional standards and receive appropriate recognition. This independent accreditation process has been developed and has been entitled Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA).¹⁹ USAMPS received academy accreditation in April 2010 along with the Department of the Army Civilian Police Academy (DACP). The following year, in April of 2011, the MP One Station Unit Training (OSUT) and CID Special Agent Course received program accreditation too. Additionally, USAMPS Staff and Faculty Course in April 2011 received their program accreditation needed to maintain our academy accreditation.

The Special Victims Unit Training Course (program accreditation)—has started the accreditation process now and expect accreditation in Nov 2012.

ACE: The American Council on Education was founded in 1918 and is the only higher education organization that represents presidents and chancellors of all types of U.S. accredited, degree-granting institutions: community colleges and four-year institutions, private and public universities, and nonprofit and for-profit colleges. ACE represents the interests of more than 1,600 campus executives, as well as 200 leaders of higher education-related associations and organizations. Since 1945, the American Council on Education (ACE) has provided a collaborative link between the U. S. Department of Defense and higher education through the review of military training and experiences for the award of equivalent college credits for members of the Armed Forces.²⁰

ACA: The American Correctional Association shapes the future of corrections through strong, progressive leadership that brings together various voices and forges coalitions and partnerships to promote the concepts embodied in its Declaration of Principles.²¹ The USAMPS Interment/Resettlement Specialist Course was accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections (CAC) through the American Correctional Association (ACA) in August 2011. This accreditation also led to the U.S. Army receiving the very prestigious Golden Eagle award from ACA.

The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) is an additional professional organization the MPC is seeking out as an enabler. CALEA's definition is below:

CALEA: Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies was formed as a credentialing authority through the joint efforts of law enforcement's major executive associations. The four associations outlined on the CALEA's webpage are the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), National Sheriff's Association (NSA) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).²²

The CALEA Accreditation Process is a proven modern management model; once implemented, it presents the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), on a continuing basis, with a blueprint that promotes the efficient use of resources and improves service delivery regardless of the size, geographic location, or functional responsibilities of the agency.²³

Two additional outside organizations the MPC can fully tap into as enablers for increasing the level of policing expertise are the *International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)* and *National Institute of Justice (NIJ)*. The mission of ICITAP is to work with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism. Situated in the Department of Justice's Criminal Division, and funded primarily by the State Department, ICITAP provides international development assistance that supports both national security and foreign policy objectives.²⁴ ICITAP supported missions in Iraq and Afghanistan focusing on building the capacity of trained police forces. ICITAP has a diverse set of expertise that includes the following: Anti-corruption, Combating Terrorism, Corrections, Critical Incident and Response and Forensic Assistance. Developing a working relationship with ICITAP is a wise investment for the MPC and aligns with our requirement to operate within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) environment. ICITAP's years of experience and knowledge base developing police

organizations, coupled with their other areas of expertise make it important that the MPC should foster a working relationship with them.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is the research, development and evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of Justice and is dedicated to improving knowledge and understanding of crime and justice issues through science. NIJ provides objective and independent knowledge and tools to reduce crime and promote justice, particularly at the state and local levels.²⁵ NIJ also has very well-defined strategic goals for their organization that can benefit the MPC leader development. NIJ offers several online courses as part of professional development. The National Institute of Justice is committed to being a transformative force in the criminal justice field by meeting five strategic challenges: fostering science-based criminal justice practices, translating knowledge to practice, advancing technology, and working across disciplines to make a more effective criminal justice system, and adopting a global perspective.²⁶

The way ahead for the MPC includes two programs that have been studied for the past four years and will have a definite and lasting impact on the technical competencies of the MPC. The estimated cost to implement these programs is \$220K, which is a very small percentage, according to the Rand study, of the \$637.3 million estimated annual cost to create an SPF.

The first program involves creating a College of Military Police Sciences (COMPS) located at the home of the Regiment—Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. I briefed this concept, which was well received, during USAMPS's 2010 Regimental Conference that brought in senior MP leaders from around the globe. COMPS is a comprehensive plan that will provide the framework and management oversight for several initiatives.

The first major initiative would involve establishing accreditation recognized by the American Council on Education (ACE), Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA), Council on Occupational Education (COE) and ACA which provides USAMPS Commandant the authority to confer college credit for all courses designed and taught. Further, this accreditation can lead to the ability for USAMPS to confer a fully accepted and accredited Associate Degree and/or Bachelor's Degree in Criminal Justice. This would mean that USAMPS could graduate soldiers with college credits from USAMPS training that would be accepted at any college or university for transfer credit in a liberal arts or criminal justice degree program at the soldiers' current duty location. Further, the USAMPS Accreditations team would work to establish and formalize affiliations with local universities and colleges that would also accept such transfer credits towards a degree at their institutions.

The College of Military Police Science will afford all Military Police Soldiers and Leaders the opportunity to seek individual college credit through transfer credit and/or ACE accreditations or obtain personal and professional growth through the completion of these courses offered. Further, the College of Military Police Science will offer certification that will pertain to the following areas: Law Enforcement, Corrections and Full Spectrum Operations. Such certifications will add to the professional growth of soldiers and increase their skills sets while making each soldier even more valuable as a police officer in any organization, military or civilian.²⁷ One of COMPS's successes is linked to the MP Soldier enrolling in a menu of distributed learning (dL) (courses similar to the Army Correspondence Courses (ACC)) and applying the courses towards college credits. Many MP soldiers could receive constructive college credit based on military


training and operational experiences already completed with the goal of transferring credit towards a degree. This definitely could have a lasting impact on the MPC's future.

The second initiative that is co-linked with COMPS centers on the creation of an Advanced Law Enforcement Education Resource Network (ALE2RN) designed to be an integral part of being a "Law Enforcement Center of Excellence." ALE2RN umbrella includes seven pillars that directly impact on the Career Management Field (CMF) 31 (Military Occupational Series # for Military Police) education and training continuum:

- Collegiate Accreditation of CMF 31 Individual Military Training (IMT), Professional Military Education and Functional training

- Branch Continuing Education
- Branch 31 In-Service Education and Training
- Constructive Credit
- Civilian Training Credit
- Branch Accreditations
- Branch Certifications

Figure # 3 captures the overall intent, a comprehensive Career Management Field (CMF) 31 branch education and training program that fully identifies unit, institutional, professional continuing education and branch certifications:



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Figure 3: CMF 31 Pillars of Education for COMPS

The MPC in 2012 and beyond has a unique opportunity to expand on the technical policing competencies across the entire force structure. In summary, the key ways to expand the MPC's technical policing expertise are as follows:

- Credentialing
- Local/Regional Policing partnerships that capitalizes on cross pollinating best practices (LEPs, ICITAP, NIJ, etc.)
- Emphasize knowledge, skills and abilities
- COMPS & ALE²RN programs

The initiatives outlined above will have a strategic impact, not only within the MPC, but throughout the Army and DoD. U.S. Government and DoD operational and strategic goals that focus on policing development validate the need for the MPC to seriously consider these initiatives. As DoD continues to scrutinize the services' strategic impact in fulfilling the primary goals of the National Military Strategy (NMS), nested with the National Security Strategy, shaping the future force stands out.

Our focus on leadership, not simply power, necessitates that we emphasize our values and our people as much as our platforms and

capabilities. The all volunteer force will remain our greatest strategic asset and the best example of the values we represent. In addition, we *must continue to find innovative and affordable ways to provide the full range of capabilities necessary to fulfill this strategy while making difficult tradeoffs between modernization, capacity, capability, posture, and risk.*²⁹

Some of these initiatives have already been implemented as discussed, however the remaining ones will require valuable resources—time, personnel and funding as the MPC does its part of shaping the future force.

Endnotes

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